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I

n their article How Will Technology
Change the Face of Chinese Justice?
(Columbia Journal of Asian Law,
2020), Professor Zhiyu Li of Durham
Law School and Professor Benjamin
Chen of the University of Hong Kong
examine China’s aggressive efforts
to technologize court processes and
how the Chinese public and litigants
view those efforts. Based on an original survey of roughly 1,000 netizens
and interviews of over 100 legal aid
seekers, the authors find that internet
and artificial intelligence technologies
are helping Chinese courts address
case backlogs and improve efficiency
and giving litigants more cost-effective options for settling disputes. But,
the authors note, technology also may
be sidelining the lawyers and legal
activists who can identify systemic
problems and challenge the “ideological hegemony of the state,” leading to
a new “Chinese brand of authoritarian
legality.”
The following is a Q&A with Li and
Chen, led by Professor Shitong Qiao
of Duke Law School, about the study’s
findings and the idea that court technology is reshaping the face of justice
in China.

SHITONG QIAO: Firstly, congratulations on this wonderful paper. It’s an
important topic. For the benefit of our
readers, can you tell us in a nutshell
about your basic argument — how will
technology change the face of Chinese
justice?
BENJAMIN CHEN: China is one of the
jurisdictions that has really been pushing the use of technology in courts.
When we first became interested in
this phenomenon, it had already been
going on for some time, and many others had written on the subject. But we
thought that the then-current contributions to the subject were still quite
limited. Many of them tended to focus
on a particular application of technology, such as the use of blockchain for
storing evidence or the use of automated transcription systems. We
wanted to look beyond specific applications and consider why technology
is being introduced at such a pace in
the Chinese legal system, and to what
ends?
So, when we think about how technology will change the face of Chinese
justice, the question we first ask is
what problems or needs are the tech-

nological innovations responding to?
Once we have some idea of what they
are responding to, we can try to broach
the question of whether or not they
are going to be successful. In the article, we lay out three tensions in the
Chinese legal system which technology could help alleviate. First, Chinese
courts are inundated by millions of
cases, and a primary cause of that is
the move towards legality. There’s a
deliberate shift away from political
dispute resolution mechanisms like 信
访(letters and visits) toward the judicial process, and that has resulted in
a sharp rise in court caseloads. But
related to this move toward legality is
the professionalization of the judiciary.
In the past, anyone could be a judge.
But not anymore. The quota judge
reform drastically reduced the number of court officials who could serve
as adjudicators. That means an explosion in the average number of cases
that each judge has to handle. So an
important reason why certain kinds of
technologies are being introduced is to
help judges decide cases more quickly
and efficiently. This reason is familiar
to everyone.
Another tension we identify is the
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one between adherence to rule of law
and social harmony. China descended
into chaos during the Cultural
Revolution. Traditional rules and institutions all came under attack. After the
Cultural Revolution, the legal system
had to be rebuilt. Deng Xiaoping called
for the rule of law. Of course, rule of
law as it’s espoused in China does not
coincide with Western, liberal democratic conceptions of the rule of law
— but the idea very broadly speaking
is that there were going to be certain
general rules of conduct governing private and public conduct, and this would
restore stability and order to society.
But the discourse of law and rights
also resulted in mass dissatisfaction.
Law disrupts social relationships. If
you apply it too rigidly, you can create
outcomes that are unfair. Also, when
people start claiming rights as entitlements, they become more pugnacious
and less willing to compromise. And so
the Hu-Wen administration articulated
this notion of a harmonious society.
That was a time when mediation was
being heavily promoted as a form of
dispute resolution. The imperative to
mediate was so strong that there are
many instances of forced settlements,
of parties being coerced into mediated
agreements that judges knew would
not ultimately be enforced. In fact, the
number of cases a judge successfully
mediates remains a criteria by which
they are assessed.
Technology also helps alleviate this
second tension. In many courthouses
in China, there are machines that offer
predictions of the chances of success
in civil suits and warn plaintiffs about
the dangers of litigation — not just the
financial cost, but also the relational,
emotional costs. These machines try to
steer people toward settlement, but in
a way that does not ignore legal rules.
And they benefit from this appear-

In many courthouses
in China, there are
machines that offer
predictions of the
chances of success
in civil suits and
warn plaintiffs
about the dangers
of litigation — not
just the financial
cost, but also the
relational, emotional
costs.
ance of scientific objective. They tell
people, “Based on the law, here are
your chances of success. They’re not
looking great, so you should reconsider
your position and maybe reach some
agreement with the other party.” This
logic is reinforced by articles in official media publicizing these machines.
Because they appear to be scientifically
objective, machine predictions can dissuade people away from litigating a
case to the bitter end. But at the same
time, machine predictions don’t ignore
the legal rules. The rules are still there,
and people bargain in the shadow of
them.
The third tension we address is
quite interesting. Here, we are a little
more cautious. We are not saying this
is being done on purpose. There aren’t
any official statements saying this is the
objective, of course not. The tension is
that, on the one hand, the party-state
does want people to assert their rights,
but on the other hand, it doesn’t want
them coming together, it doesn’t want

them to cultivate group consciousness.
A strategy which predates the enthusiasm for AI and machine learning is
the atomization of collective actions.
Sometimes parties are allowed to bring
class actions, but courts can also dismantle these class actions back into
individual actions. People are encouraged to assert their rights, but when
they band together, it could threaten
the ideological control of the party
state and this threat has to be carefully
managed.
The interesting thing about some of
the technologies being introduced is
that they democratize law. There are
a variety of apps that tell people what
the law is, or that help people draft
complaints. And these apps bring the
law closer to people. They promote
this vision that people can, should use
the law as their weapon. But technology also dis-intermediates lawyers.
And the way it does that is if you can
solve a problem easily, if you can find
a solution online, there’s less of a
need to go to lawyers, there’s less of a
need to consult knowledgeable neighbors. And when there’s less of such a
need, lawyers become less important
as nodes of collective action, because
they’re not going to have as many clients with the same interests, they are
not going to have this constituency
standing behind them. They’re going
to have less clout in the larger scheme
of things. Again we are not saying this
is being done intentionally, but technology certainly also responds to this
tension in Chinese justice.
So these were the theoretical perspectives we developed when we
started thinking more broadly about
the kinds of technologies being
deployed in the Chinese legal system.
Then we decided to go into the field
and talk to ordinary people, netizens,
litigants. What do they make of all
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this? I’m going to leave that to Zhiyu.
Zhiyu, do you want to summarize who
we spoke to, what our findings were,
and what these findings can tell us
about how technology will change the
face of Chinese justice?

ZHIYU LI: Sure. I’ll just add a few details
about the empirical findings of our
paper. Instead of answering whether
AI or modern technology would deliver
better justice, our article explores
whether and how technologizing the
judiciary could shape public perception
of the legal system. During the literature review phase of this research, we
came across many sources focusing on
how legal professionals or government
officials interacted with technology in
Chinese courts. Ben and I then thought
maybe we could look at a different
perspective — what do prospective litigants think about such changes? Have
they heard of the availability of these
AI applications? How useful did they
believe those applications to be? That’s
what led us to survey a number of netizens and interview legal aid seekers
in China regarding their views about
technology in the legal domain.
What we found quite interesting is
that even if AI-powered machines can’t
always offer disputants more accurate
legal guidance, the seemingly scientific
analysis they produce could still have
an effect on disputants’ acceptance of
judicial outcomes or their satisfaction
with the dispute resolution system in
general.
Years ago, China started to promote the use of mediation in courts.
Mediation was seen as a relationship-oriented approach that helps
people resolve their disputes in a
peaceful way. The logic behind it is
that litigation always creates winners
and losers, but mediation may create a
kind of win-win situation. But often-

times litigants would end up reaching
an agreement under pressure and later
regret the settlement.
Nowadays in China, there are
machines set up in court lobbies called
one-stop terminals. One of the functions these machines perform is to
assess litigation risk and costs. People
using these machines might think,
“Even if I don’t know how the machine
reached its conclusions, looking at the
cost of money and the cost of time
going through the litigation process,
I’m making a more informed and rational decision to choose mediation.”
We also asked legal aid seekers about
whether they had heard of technological applications in courts and whether
they had used them. We found that
quite a few of the disputants had heard
of the applications and saw them as a
way to educate themselves about the
law. And they thought the technological applications were quite convenient
for filing complaints online and getting
updates about the judicial proceedings, which brought courts closer to
them. Now courts are in their palms.
Litigants can take out their phone, pull
out the mobile court app, file the complaint, and communicate with court
staff in a real time manner.

QIAO: Is the article based more on
theoretical analysis or on empirical
investigations? This one-stop terminal, does it tell litigants or potential
litigants their chance of winning? If
yes, how accurate is that?
And have you talked to people
who actually have had an experience
where they were in mediation, or
they were going to litigate their case
in court, but decided to settle based on
the information they received from
this one-stop terminal or based on
what the judges have told them about
the AI prediction of law?

LI: These are great questions. First,
the one-stop terminals give a percentage indicating how likely it is a
complainant will win her case if she
decides to go through the litigation
process. The big-data analysis is said to
be based on the nature of the dispute
and the judgments of similar cases.
Second, the terminals list the costs
of the litigation from various dimensions — the financial cost, the cost to
relationships, and the cost of time. The
terminal may also outline relevant legal
rules for the disputes and describe the
stages of litigation — how you should
go forward with the process and what
kind of materials you would need at
each stage of litigation. It also has
other functions. For example, some of
the terminals can generate automatically a complaint for the litigant. This
is the general picture of what a onestop terminal can do.
Now, for the litigants who have tried
these functions, what do they think
about them? It was difficult for us to
approach people using these machines
outside the courthouse. However,
there were a few local newspapers
which interviewed litigants in court
lobbies. Litigants were asked about
their opinions on how useful and
reliable the machines were. One interviewee said he found it very useful, and
after being informed of the costs and
the likelihood of winning the case, he
decided to choose mediation. There is a
mediation room in the courthouse and
online mediation platforms he could
use, he was quite satisfied with this
informed choice.
Even for some of the legal aid seekers we interviewed who have never
used some of these technological innovations, they were quite interested in
using them in the future. One reason
is that it is quite cheap, less costly than
consulting a lawyer. And some of them
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said consulting a lawyer could help
them get a difficult case into the court,
but if they can get a case accepted on
their own, they will just rely on technology, AI, to remedy their grievances
in courts, by themselves.

QIAO: You have talked about different kinds of technologies in your
paper. The most appealing one we
are talking about here is AI, artificial
intelligence, talking about the prediction of the outcome of a specific case.
That’s, of course, revolutionary. But it
is a question whether such a prediction is possible and reliable. A recent
study which I co-supervised with a
computer scientist at Duke finds that
the accuracy rate of predicting results
of Chinese administrative litigation
is about 80 percent. I would imagine
for civil litigation there could be more
uncertainty in AI prediction.
In your paper you also talk about
other kinds of technologies, such as
automated transcription or even just
simply digitalization of the judicial
process, including the online publication of judicial documents, which is
basically a judicial version of e-governance in China, which has been going
on for quite a while. Both digitalization of Chinese judicial documents
and judicial process and using AI to
predict litigation results are important, but the implications are different.
So to help our readers understand the
reality in the Chinese judicial terrain
more specifically, to what extent has
AI been used in Chinese courts?
CHEN: This is a good question. And
it can be answered at two levels. I’ll
answer it specifically, and then I’ll zoom
out and say why we think the question is not just about courts but, more
broadly, about how society perceives
justice that’s being meted out in courts.

The thing about technologies is
that some of them, such as the online
platforms that publish judgments,
are visible and available to everyone. Although we know from recent
events that when sensitive topics
come up, cases might be deleted from
some of these repositories, but generally speaking, it’s something the public
can observe. The cases are uploaded to
China Judgments Online. Trials are also
livestreamed on China Trials online.
Those are things that the public can
observe, and it’s very easy to say how
well or how badly it’s going. We know,
for example, when it comes to uploading cases — I think other scholars have
investigated this quite extensively
— not all cases are actually being
uploaded to China J u d g m e n t s
Online, although many of them are,
and the disclosure rate really varies
across provinces.
But the technologies that are being
used by judges are not so observable by
the public. It’s very hard to say to what
extent, for example, an algorithm is
correctly predicting the appropriate
sentence, say, in a robbery case. There
we can only rely on what judges have
said. And in fact, their feedback has
generally not been very positive. So
when it comes to, for example, similar
case search algorithms, the judges have
said the similar cases that have been
found by algorithms, they’re not dissimilar, but they’re not close enough to
actually be helpful. Zhiyu and I are now
working on a project where we try to
use AI to look for similar cases, and we
have the same experience. It’s easy to
classify cases by broad types, but when
you need to find a case that’s analogous to the one you have, the results
obtained by AI are not impressive. And
that is what judges have said.
And so on the whole, the achievements of Chinese courts in adopting

AI are sometimes exaggerated. It’s true
that there’s a lot of interest, and there’s
a lot of hype around the use of technology. But to what extent it’s been
practically successful, that’s debatable.
As far as we can tell, its success is a little overblown.
But taking a step back, I want to
talk a little about the bigger picture.
Because when we consider the use of
AI in Chinese courts and the attention
it has attracted both domestically and
internationally, it’s really not just about
how technology will change the face
of Chinese courts, but also the face of
Chinese justice. Hence the title of our
article, because the truth is many of
us will never see the inside of a court,
many of us will never get to experience
a real case. The only live cases I’ve seen
were as a law clerk; I’ve never actually
experienced a case as a litigant myself.
When we judge the legal system of
a society, even one we live under, we
rely on vague conceptions we have,
some stories we hear. And that is the
motivation for our research. The critical questions for us are not, “To what
extent has technology actually penetrated Chinese courts? To what extent
is it really helping to reduce the time
taken to solve a case?” Because courts
sometimes declare in official reports
that “the time to resolve the case has
gone down by 50 percent.” I mean,
we’re a little skeptical.
Instead, we want to ask, “Has the
public heard of these reforms? What
is the opinion of laypeople regarding
the use of technology? Do they think
it will make the law fairer, more determinate?” That’s our starting point, and
that’s what makes the project exciting for us. It’s not just about how well
a specific piece of technology is working but whether technology as a whole
is changing the way people see legal
institutions.
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So, we recruited people on the internet and asked if they have heard about
these changes, and how they understand them. We find that most people
have heard of, for example, the initiative to publish Chinese judgments
online. I was quite surprised that more
than half of them have heard of the
initiative and a good fraction of them
have even visited the official website.
We also intercepted people entering
or exiting legal aid clinics. A question
we asked these legal aid seekers is
the extent to which they trusted algorithmic predictions. Again, it doesn’t
matter how accurate the algorithm
truly is, what we’re interested in is,
how much store the public will set by
such predictions, the kind that they’re
getting in the lobbies of the courts?
And we find that most of them still
prefer human expertise. If the machine
said one thing and the human another,
the majority of them would believe the
human. But a proportion of them would
believe the machine, and they believe
the machine for the reasons you might
expect —machines are more impartial,
they’re not given to the same prejudices as humans, et cetera.
This is a very long answer, but there’s
what’s really happening in the courts
and also what society perceives, which
is its own form of reality.

QIAO: I agree with you, it’s not only
about the Chinese courts, but more
broadly about justice in China, particularly how ordinary people think
about the courts and justice in China.
It seems there are at least two effects
of this rise of technology — first, that
it could potentially make the Chinese
justice system or the Chinese judicial system more trustworthy and
also more predictable. But the second
one I found even more fascinating:
transparency and disclosures. This

Many of our
interviewees
favored human
lawyers over
AI because, for
example, they
perceived the
assistance of
lawyers as two-way
communications
instead of oneway interaction,
and they thought
lawyers sometimes
can look at their
disputes in a more
comprehensive
way.
mass online digital publication of
Chinese judicial documents has significantly democratized law in China.
China had been “sending law to the
countryside” three, four decades ago,
but this is on a different scale, this is
where technology really works. So it
is democratizing law and also raising
people’s legal consciousness.
A while ago — maybe you saw this
after the case of the lady in Xuzhou
— people dug out hundreds of judicial decisions about women being
kidnapped and saw how light the
sentences had been. That definitely, I
think, is a demonstration of the democratization effect and also increasing
people’s legal consciousness.
So that’s great. But you also men-

tioned another maybe less great but
very interesting observation — that
technology actually could dis-intermediate lawyers in China. I would love
to hear a little bit more about that,
because I can think of arguments both
for and also against this dis-intermediation effect of the mass publication
of judgments in China.

LI: You both raised a very important
point. I found it very interesting when
Shitong mentioned legal consciousness, legal consciousness of the public.
Here, we might need to distinguish
individual legal consciousness from
group legal consciousness. These AI
applications or the use of digital platforms might be able to help individuals
access justice, because people can file
their complaints online and they can
seek remedy for their grievances without first paying for a quite expensive
consultation with a lawyer. That’s one
side of the story.
On the other hand, for group legal
consciousness, the promotion and the
advancement of AI in courts might
impact the evolution of the legal system in the long run. As Ben said, many
of our interviewees favored human
lawyers over AI because, for example, they perceived the assistance
of lawyers as two-way communications instead of one-way interaction,
and they thought lawyers sometimes
can look at their disputes in a more
comprehensive way. That’s why they
trusted human lawyers. However, a
few disputants we interviewed very
much preferred AI over human lawyers. Some of them were concerned
about the financial burden of litigation
and some of them thought machines to
be more objective because their analyses were not contaminated by so-called
human factors.
One of the points we raise is that if
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there are some people, even a small
group of people, who prefer AI and are
going to make use of modern technology or are going to only rely on these
kinds of applications to seek remedies for their grievances, then the use
of technology might be distancing
these people from legal professionals. Lawyers can help promote change
in the legal system, by bringing clients
with similar disputes together, by publicizing deficiencies in the law, and by
appealing for change. This is how AI
can broaden access to justice but can
also reduce the social influence of lawyers or knowledgeable laypersons.

QIAO: So basically, you’re saying that
while technology gives Chinese litigants more autonomy, it also has this
effect of dis-intermediating lawyers
and perhaps preventing lawyers from
acting as representatives of group
consciousness or agents of social and
legal change. That’s, I think, a fascinating point to make, although I’m
not entirely persuaded.
CHEN: We don’t think it’s happening
on a massive scale, but the possibility certainly exists. In the paper, we
discussed actual instances of NGOs
bringing public interest litigation. And
for many NGOs, finding a plaintiff is
very difficult, because many plaintiffs
don’t want to be the face of some kind
of public campaign. They want to get
their compensation and be on their
way. In fact, many of these NGOs have
to work around the concerns of the litigants they are representing, by trying
to preserve their privacy, by promising
to fight for better payouts.
But technology makes it very easy
for individuals to seek justice in the
courts, to get an assessment of how
strong their claim is. Apps will even

help them draft and file the complaint.
That makes it even more difficult for
NGOs to operate and barefoot lawyers to help others start lawsuits. And
when they operate, usually they’re not
just trying to win the individual case,
they’re trying to draw social attention to the plight of a particular class
of people. Like we said, this is not part
of the official narrative; the government or the state is not saying we are
doing this to reduce the influence of
NGOs, activists, and barefoot lawyers.
But this is a natural consequence of
democratizing access to law and it is
very real.
You just mentioned the Xuzhou
case, and that is a very good example. Because what happened is once
people began searching for similar
human trafficking cases, those cases
were removed from China Judgments
Online. There was an outage on China
Judgments Online which was blamed
on a server issue or something like
that. But when the site eventually
came back online, those cases were
gone. That kind of illustrates what
we’re talking about—judicial transparency is a virtue but not when it starts
getting people hot and heavy.
People often think of the Chinese
party-state as being hostile to individual rights. But it’s not completely
true, if you look at its history. There’s
a fantastic book called Legal Lessons:
Popularizing Laws in the People’s
Republic of China, which basically
retrieves the history of legal education and legal consciousness in the
People’s Republic up until the ’80s.
The party-state has always been quite
active in terms of promoting people’s rights consciousness. Of course,
much depends on the time period we
are talking about, but there’s been sustained efforts to educate citizens about

their rights. In fact, the term 维权
(rights protection) was initially introduced by the party state, although it
was later appropriated by civil activists
to mean something a little different.
So people tend to think of China as a
jurisdiction that’s hostile to individual
rights, but that’s not entirely the case.
What concerns the party-state is not
so much that people are asserting their
rights, but that they’re asserting their
rights in a way that challenges official
narratives or causes people to coalesce
and form organized groups that pose
threats to stability and maintenance of
order.
And so, the example you raise, the
Xuzhou case, that’s a very good example, because there’s nothing wrong
with citizens looking up judgments,
learning from them, even criticizing
them from time to time. But once an
issue gathers social attention, once
people are all focusing on specific
instances of governmental failure —
and it’s happening even now on Weibo
[a Chinese microblogging platform],
where a lot of people are still talking
about this — then it becomes a bit dangerous to the party-state. And that’s
when things get deleted. That illustrates the tension we are talking about.
And we’re not saying technology is
being designed to dis-intermediate
lawyers. And the government doesn’t
say that. But that is a necessary consequence. If people are going to be able
to rely on apps to tell them, “Okay, this
is what you can expect from law, this is
how you file your claim. It’s very easy.
You just click, you don’t even have to
show up at the courthouse,” there’s
less of a need to go to barefoot lawyers
who might get you in trouble with the
authorities, there’s less of need to go
to NGOs which could be politically not
on the correct side.
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How big is this effect going to be?
Well, it might not be very big, in terms
of the number of cases, as a proportion of the total number of cases. But
its impact on NGOs, I think, could be
quite substantial, because many of
them are already having trouble finding litigants. They’re operating under
a lot of pressure, and even more so
now that some people don’t even have
a need to go to them, especially ordinary litigants who are not trying to
make a point, but just trying to get
compensation.

QIAO: Basically, you’re saying that
even talking about dis-intermediating lawyers, there are both negative
and positive things. In the Xuzhou
case, maybe it’s not a bad thing, actually, that people are taking law back to
their hands. They don’t even have to
rely on lawyers as intermediary profession — lawyers could be controlled
and co-opted, but once millions of
people have access, that’s different.
One last question on one of the theoretical angles of your paper. How does
your paper intervene in the legality
debate? On one hand you are talking
about China’s turn towards law, and
the increasing legality actually is kind
of a background, and why Chinese
courts are now interested in being
equipped with AI. That’s one side of
the story. The other side that you have
said, well, Chinese courts are using
AI for technology basically to induce
people to go to mediation, which conventionally speaking is a turn against,
or more precisely, turn away from
law, if we equate law as courts. So
just broadly speaking, I’m wondering
how your paper is intervening in this
debate about legality in China.

Chinese courts
are using AI
for technology
basically to
induce people
to go to
mediation, which
conventionally
speaking is a turn
against, or more
precisely, turn
away from law, if
we equate law as
courts.
CHEN: The way we’re intervening in
this debate is we are trying to show
technology is not just about perfecting
law. Oftentimes when we talk about
the use of technology in law, many
people think, “technology is going to
make things the same but better.” And
they don’t really think in a very jurisdiction-specific way. In the article, the
approach we take is to look at what’s
unique about the challenges that China
is facing given that it’s a socialist legal
system, et cetera.
The point you make is that on
the one hand, there is a movement
towards law-based conduct and outcomes. On the other hand, technology
is being employed to get people to settle and not actually take their claims
all the way through to adjudication.
Well, without technology, what judges
would do is they would cajole, they
would coerce parties into agreements.

And oftentimes, these agreements
were not tethered to the strength of
the legal claims, they were the result
of judges trying to hit their targets, so
they can show that they have achieved
a high mediation rate. And that is what
was described, as you mentioned, by
[Fordham law professor] Carl Minzner,
as a “turn against law,” an abandonment of legal norms because disputes
are being settled, but in ways that are
contrary to law.
But it’s not really a turn against
law if the parties settle based on the
potential outcomes from litigation,
which is what happens all the time in
the United States. You know [Harvard
law professor R.H.] Mnookin’s famous
phrase, “bargaining in the shadow
of the law.” That’s what technology
facilitates. Instead of giving judges
the license to persuade, or threaten,
parties into mediation, what happens
now is that litigants are confronted by
a percentage, something that’s very
stark, that looks objective, and that
basically is supposed to be a reflection
of their legal rights, responsibilities,
and obligations. In light of what the
legal outcome is likely to be, the parties are urged to settle.
Interviews or quotes published in
official newspapers should not be
accepted at face-value, as representative of how the public feels about these
machines. But they tell us how the
state is trying to shape mindsets and
attitudes. And the state is saying these
machines are there to assist you, you
should use them and evaluate your litigation chances. And if they don’t look
good, you should emulate what this
person being quoted in the newspaper
has done, which is to sign up for mediation. This is not really a turn against
law because settlement is based on the
relative legal merits of each case. And
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that’s how technology intervenes.
Again, we can’t be sure that the
predictions are accurate. Maybe the
predictions are off, but at least, on the
surface, the system tries to reconcile,
on the one end, adherence to legal
norms and, on the other, the desire to
promote a harmonious society.

LI: For many users, their evaluation
of courts or the adjudication process
is based not only on the outcomes of
their cases. Sometimes it is also based
on their experience with the court
staff, their evaluation of how conve-

nient, how transparent this process
was. Therefore, technologizing justice might change people’s opinions
of the legal system. For people who
have never gone to court, heightened judicial transparency could make
them think, “well, nowadays I can read
judgments online, I can nitpick judgments for typos or disagree with them.
Also, I can educate myself and be kept
informed of recent legal changes or the
judgments in disputes similar to mine.”
There is a lot of remarkable research
conducted by other scholars in the field
on the impact of technology on law and

the legal system. What we have tried
to add here is an empirical, bottom-up
view of China’s technologized justice
system.
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